In Part I of his paper Cooper gives indisputable evidence regarding Plato's use of the man-made image as a step to the apprehension of a Form under discussion, whether that image be in fact a diagram or a model, or simply a verbal picture, such as his imaginative account of Justice within a community, which we find used to provide us with in Republic 443 c 4 ff. However, Cooper goes on to assure us that the divided-line figure offers us (...) only three types of object: ‘We have three kinds of objects which differ from one another in clearness and esteem, firstly, the Forms, secondly, the objects of ordinary sense-perception, and thirdly, images, shadows and reflections.’ Now the admitted fact that, as he notes, Republic 10 gives the same three orders of reality, does not entirely absolve Cooper from all the implications of Plato's decision to divide his line into four parts rather than three; for it is made quite clear in 509 b 6–10 that the Form of the Good, is the source of being as well as of knowledge, so the Line must also classify both. (shrink)

In Part I of his paper Cooper gives indisputable evidence regarding Plato's use of the man-made image as a step to the apprehension of a Form under discussion, whether that image be in fact a diagram or a model, or simply a verbal picture, such as his imaginative account of Justice within a community, which we find used to provide us with in Republic 443 c 4 ff. However, Cooper goes on to assure us that the divided-line figure offers us (...) only three types of object: ‘We have three kinds of objects which differ from one another in clearness and esteem, firstly, the Forms, secondly, the objects of ordinary sense-perception, and thirdly, images, shadows and reflections.’ Now the admitted fact that, as he notes, Republic 10 gives the same three orders of reality, does not entirely absolve Cooper from all the implications of Plato's decision to divide his line into four parts rather than three; for it is made quite clear in 509 b 6–10 that the Form of the Good, is the source of being as well as of knowledge, so the Line must also classify both. (shrink)

I. By Ictus we mean in this paper the sounds emphasized in the pattern of an utterance in the given language under discussion. So in languages like Chinese which depend on variation of tone we mean that the high notes in the intonation tune of a sentence or the rhythmic scheme of a verse carry an ictus; while in a language based, like English, on speech stress, we mean that the syllables uttered most loudly and clearly bear the ictus. Again, (...) some languages, such as Italian, emphasize a syllable by a combination of stress and raised pitch, so in these languages we say that the syllables so emphasized receive the ictus. Lastly, in a language like ancient Greek or Vedic Sanskrit where quantity is decisive in utterance, the syllables which receive emphasis are the long ones, and thus it is these which have an ictus. (shrink)

I. By Ictus we mean in this paper the sounds emphasized in the pattern of an utterance in the given language under discussion. So in languages like Chinese which depend on variation of tone we mean that the high notes in the intonation tune of a sentence or the rhythmic scheme of a verse carry an ictus; while in a language based, like English, on speech stress, we mean that the syllables uttered most loudly and clearly bear the ictus. Again, (...) some languages, such as Italian, emphasize a syllable by a combination of stress and raised pitch, so in these languages we say that the syllables so emphasized receive the ictus. Lastly, in a language like ancient Greek or Vedic Sanskrit where quantity is decisive in utterance, the syllables which receive emphasis are the long ones, and thus it is these which have an ictus. (shrink)